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Abstract 
The Historical Varieties of Democracy Dataset (Historical V-Dem) is a new dataset containing 
about 260 indicators, both factual and evaluative, describing various aspects of political regimes 
and state institutions. The dataset covers 91 polities globally – including most large, sovereign 
states, as well as some semi-sovereign entities and large colonies – from 1789 to 1920 for many 
cases. The majority of the indicators are also included in the Varieties of Democracy dataset, 
which covers the period from 1900 to the present – and together these two datasets cover the 
bulk of “modern history”. Historical V-Dem also includes several new indicators, covering 
features that are pertinent for 19th century polities. We describe the data, the process of coding, 
and the different strategies employed in Historical V-Dem to cope with issues of reliability and 
validity and ensure inter-temporal- and cross-country comparability. To illustrate the potential 
uses of the dataset we provide a descriptive account of patterns of democratization in the “long 
19th century.” Finally, we perform an empirical investigation of how inter-state war relates to 
subsequent democratization. 
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1. Introduction 
Although many datasets describe political institutions in countries across the world (see 
Coppedge et al. 2017a), the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017b,c) 
is the most wide-ranging – including several hundred indicators and indices. While country 
coverage is impressive, historical coverage begins in 1900, omitting half of the period commonly 
included under the rubric of “modern history”. This omission poses a hindrance to systematic 
comparative description of institutional and political developments during this era, but also 
implies that several theories of political development (in the given time period and more 
generally) lack the requisite data for testing. 
To remedy this situation, we introduce the Historical Varieties of Democracy (Historical 
V-Dem) dataset. Historical V-Dem spans all major countries and several other polities in the 
world between 1789 and 1920, encapsulating what Hobsbawm (1962; 1975; 1987) has labeled the 
“Long 19th Century”. These data mean that most of the indicators contained in V-Dem now 
extend back to 1789, offering a continuous time series across more than 225 years for many 
polities. Historical V-Dem also provides several new indicators, many of them focused on 
features of state institutions and state capacity and on the type of coalitions that supported 
political regimes.  
In this article, we describe the dataset and the data collection process. Next, we address 
issues of reliability, validity, and inter-temporal- and cross-country comparability, and describe 
our strategy for dealing with them. Finally, we illustrate the potential uses of the data with two 
empirical applications. First, we map global patterns of democratization across the “long 19th 
century” using several measures from Historical V-Dem and comparing these patterns with 
those displayed by Polity2, one of the most widely used existing measures. Second, we analyze 
the relationship between international war and subsequent regime change along different 
dimensions. A key finding is that war participation correlates positively with indicators related to 
the electoral dimension, such as clean elections and suffrage, but not with other aspects of 
democracy. 
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2. Historical V-Dem and extant datasets 
Despite the proliferation of high-quality datasets describing 20th and 21st century political 
institutions, there is a dearth of data for the 19th century. Of the widely used indices, only a few 
(e.g., Marshall et al. 2015; Boix et al 2013) extend back to 1800. Moreover, the quality and level 
of detail for the 19th century coding in the historical time series of measures such as Polity2 are 
sometimes questionable, as we detail below. Further, they cover a limited range of institutional 
features, grounded in a specific conception of democracy.  
One obvious issue stemming from the dearth of systematically compiled and comparable 
cross- country data on historical institutions relates to lacking description of institutional features 
and developments in the long 19th century. Key descriptive questions in comparative politics are 
thus left open. For example, did the long, first wave of democratization stretch back to the 
beginning of the 19th century (Huntington 1991) or erupt only after WWI (Doorenspleet 2005)? 
Were there separate sub-waves of democratization after the 1848 revolutions (Weyland 2014)? 
Was the movement towards democracy across the long 19thcentury discontinuous or gradual, 
and was it monotonic or characterized by reversals (Congleton 2011; Ziblatt, 2017)? 
The lack of data also means that scholars more generally have been unable to 
satisfactorily address key questions pertaining to the causes and consequences of institutional 
development. Note that the link between institutions and most outcomes of interest (e.g., 
economic growth) is difficult to parse because of limited variation and because of the sluggish 
nature of institutions (and many outcomes). Only with a suitably long time-series can one hope 
to disentangle cause and effect (Knutsen, Møller and Skaaning 2016). Historical V-Dem thus 
opens up new opportunities for social scientists studying the historical trajectories of political-
institutional developments – including sequences of institutional reforms in different areas – as 
well as the causes and effects of political-institutional developments. 
 
3. What does Historical V-Dem cover? 
Historical V-Dem is divided into 10 surveys, covering different areas of political life: Elections; 
Parties; Executive; Legislature; Judiciary; Civil Liberties; State; Civil Society; Media; and Political 
Equality. There are two types of indicators: factual indicators coded by RAs (“A indicators”) and 
evaluative indicators coded by country experts (“C indicators”). A indicators involve features 
such as election dates, names of local government entities, the legal status of slavery, and the 
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existence of entities such as statistical agencies or national banks. C indicators pertain to features 
such as the extent of election violence, the relative power of elected and non-elected offices at 
the local level, de facto freedom from forced labor, and the extent to which recruitment to the 
bureaucracy is merit-based.  
In total, there are 149 C indicators and 110 A indicators in Historical V-Dem. Appendix 
II provides condensed lists of all indicators (full details in the V-Dem codebook). 129 C 
indicators are adopted from V-Dem, whereas there 20 are new C indicators. About 50 of the 110 
A indicators are new to Historical V-Dem. Many of the new indicators are of special relevance 
for the 19th century. 
The 19th century was an era of state building, and Historical V-Dem contains several new 
indicators pertaining to the development of state bureaucracies, armed forces, and various other 
agencies relevant for the capacity of states to gather information, monitor citizens and project 
power. For example, Historical V-Dem includes several indicators focused on how bureaucrats 
(and army officers) are recruited and remunerated – capturing important dimensions of a 
“Weberian” bureaucracy. These variables will, e.g., allow for systematic, empirical studies of 
processes of modern state formation – a core area of political science where most empirical 
contributions to date have been based on lengthy case narratives (e.g., Fukuyama 2014).  
Second, Historical V-Dem includes new indicators pertaining to “regimes” – understood 
here as a set of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders and their 
exercise of power. For instance, indicators capture when and how a particular regime ended, the 
size of regime support coalitions, and which social groups are included in that coalition. These 
data will allow for empirical testing of arguments pertaining to particular social groups, e.g., 
agrarian elites or urban middle class, and their relevance for regime stability and change (see, e.g., 
Moore 1966; Ansell and Samuels 2015). Likewise, they allow for test9ng whether size of regime 
support coalition has implications for policymaking in foreign and domestic policy arenas 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). 
Polities included in Historical V-Dem are a) sizeable (>250000 inhabitants); b) sovereign 
during an extended time period between 1789 and 1900, either in a formal-juridical or de facto 
sense; and, c) are continuous with present-day states.1 The resulting sample includes 91 polities – 
14 from Africa and the Middle East, 21 from the Americas, 14 from Asia and the Pacific, and 42 
																																								 																				
1 Regarding b), we include data for 1789-1920 even if a unit was not independent during the entire period, given that 
the area is not directly covered by the coding of another polity. To exemplify, this means that Brazil is coded from 
1789-1920, even if Brazil became truly independent from Portugal only in 1822.  
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from Europe – whereof 71 are listed by Gleditsch & Ward (1999). Details on the sample are 
presented in Appendix I.  
 
Figure 1: Existence and type of legislature (v3lgbicam) for 1790 (top), 1850 (middle), and 
1899 (bottom).  
 
Note: The maps are produced for Historical V-Dem by digitizing and editing online map sources (see anonymized 
reference). Correspondence with Historical V-Dem units is, however, still not entirely accurate, especially for non-
sovereign entities. 
 
The modal time series is 1789-1920. More specifically, 41 polities are coded for this 
interval (66 start in 1789). However, some polities cease to exist as independent entities well 
before 1920, such as Bavaria (coded 1789-1871) with the creation of the German Empire. 
Others cease to exist for a period of time before they reappear. Tuscany, for example, is not 
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coded between 1807 and 1814 as it was annexed by France under Napoleon. The rule is that a 
particular area should not be coded for more than one political entity in a single year, and we 
have carefully gone through the history of border changes and specified the entities for the 
different parts of the time period (see the V-Dem countries document for details). Figure 1 maps 
the polities included in Historical V-Dem in 1790, 1850 and 1900, respectively, coloring 
countries by the existence and chamber structure of the legislature (v3lgbicam), one of the 
indicators that cover all 91 polities. 
 
4. How was Historical V-Dem constructed? 
Constructing this dataset required significant human and financial resources. Planning started in 
2013, using as our point of departure the contemporary V-Dem codebook (Coppedge et al. 
2017b). Successive rounds of deliberation were required in order to identify contemporary V-
Dem questions to a) omit, b) adjust (in order to fit the historical context), or c) create anew. Pilot 
surveys were conducted on Denmark and Colombia in 2014, after which we received comments 
and identified potentially problematic questions that needed to be dropped or revised.  
Although V-Dem coding for the contemporary era (1900–) rests on a group of coders 
(generally about five per country), it was not feasible to achieve the same complement for the 
historical era. Detailed historical knowledge of political affairs is much rarer than knowledge of 
contemporary political affairs, especially with respect to small and understudied countries. Under 
these circumstances, only a few experts around the world would be able to code Bavaria, 
Madagascar or Oman in 1800. Thus, we followed a narrow strategy of recruitment, seeking to 
identify one or two highly qualified experts for each historical case. We also compensated 
experts for their time in a fairly generous fashion (1250 to 2000 Euro per country, depending on 
estimated workload), with the understanding that they would need to consult sources in order to 
answer many of the questions – a time-consuming process.  
Team members and research assistants compiled long lists of potential country experts, 
employing scholarly networks and web- and literature searches. Ideal experts should have an 
academic track record working on the political history of the country. Experts with identifiable 
competencies in a broad range of political-institutional features were prioritized, and, everything 
else equal, experts with comparative knowledge of other countries were also prioritized (see V-
Dem Organization and Management document for details). In the end, most experts were 
historians or historically oriented political scientists. A few experts were asked to code more than 
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one polity if they had comprehensive knowledge of different polities (for example, the expert for 
Baden also coded Würtemberg). The coding was conducted through a web-platform constructed 
for V-Dem and customized for Historical V-Dem. Experts had the opportunity to contact the 
team with questions of clarification and information about potential issues with the pre-coded 
data on, e.g., election dates or heads of state and government. These issues were then discussed 
by the team, and identified errors were corrected before the expert ensued coding.  
Country-expert coding (including updated coding for the pilot countries) started in 
December 2015 and is still ongoing, currently with a special focus on double-coding using a 
second country expert. (The ambition is to have a high ratio of double coded polities for 
updated versions of Historical V-Dem within the next couple of years.) Research assistants, 
located at several universities, were involved in coding the A variables. Thereafter, codings 
would be checked by a team member or another RA for validation (and possible adjustments).2  
 
5. Methodological problems and solutions 
The specificity of most indicators in the Historical V-Dem dataset ameliorates the fuzziness of 
questions in other datasets, which often pertain to diffuse topics as “executive constraints” or 
the “competitiveness of executive recruitment” (Polity IV). However, this specificity also places 
a tremendous burden on coders to ascertain the facts of a historical case, e.g., to pin down the 
extent of vote fraud in an election. Most experts agreed to be publically acknowledged for their 
work on a particular country, ensuring full transparency and offering an additional incentive to 
provide accurate coding.   
As with contemporary V-Dem, we faced a challenge in achieving equivalence across 
countries and experts. We want to ensure that when, e.g., scores between France and Russia in 
1880 differ, this is because the situation in these two countries differ and not simply because our 
expert on France is more or less “conservative” than the Russian expert. We therefore employ a 
latent variable model to generate estimates based on various sources of information, described 
below, anchoring scores across time and space to a common scale. Point estimates in this dataset 
are accompanied by uncertainty estimates (Pemstein et al. 2017) to reflect measurement error; 
for additional information regarding uncertainty, experts also rate their own subjective certainty 
																																								 																				
2 For the pre-unification German and Italian states, we employed a separate German RA and Italian RA, respectively, 
for many A questions. This reflects the demanding source situation for these small, no longer existing states, and the 
importance of identifying and reading native-language sources. These RAs were provided with similar instructions 
and coding templates as the “global” RAs for each question. 
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(from 0-100) for each observation (typically a variable-country-year). Issues of uncertainty are 
perhaps even more pertinent for the historical period than more recent years, due to a dearth of 
sources and fewer scholars that specialize in the political institutions of this period. Accordingly, 
uncertainty about historical point estimates is generally higher than in contemporary V-Dem.  
Incorporating historical ratings into the V-Dem modeling framework required the team 
to implement several model refinements.3 Regarding key sources of information fed into the 
measurement model, historical experts were encouraged with an additional monetary incentive to 
code three extra countries for a single year. Participants in this additional coding selected the 
three countries from a list of six (USA, UK, France, Mexico, China, and Russia), and coded all 
variables for the first year after 1900 with an election for each selected country. This procedure 
provides us with one source of information for assessing how historical experts differ in their 
understanding of the question scale.  
Second, all historical experts coded an identical set of indicator-specific anchoring 
vignettes (King & Wand, 2007) prior to coding their cases. Vignettes provide a powerful tool for 
addressing differences in ordinal scale perception (“Differential Item Functioning”) by allowing 
us to compare coders who do not share expertise across cases. In our case, vignettes represent 
hypothetical cases specific to each indicator that have two plausible scores on the question scale 
(see Appendix III). Experts’ ratings of the hypothetical cases provide information about 
differences in how each expert translates concrete aspects of cases into ordinal ratings. 
Third, experts also coded an overlap period with contemporary V-Dem of about twenty 
years, typically 1900-1920, for either the polity that they coded prior to 1900 or that country’s 
successor state (e.g. Italy for Modena). Overlap years thus include data from historical and 
contemporary experts. By comparing an historical expert’s scores during this period to those of 
her contemporary colleagues, the measurement model algorithm is able to assess both her 
reliability and the degree to which she systematically codes different ordinal categories than her 
peers. Because those within-country peers are also bridged – through coding of additional cases 
and through vignettes – to the rest of the contemporary coders, this overlap period helps to 
anchor historical coders to the contemporary period. 
Though these methods could have in principle been sufficient to ensure cross-temporal 
and cross-national comparability, preliminary analyses indicated that there were too few 
overlapping observations for the original measurement model to adequately adjust for 
																																								 																				
3 See Pemstein et. al. (2017) for a full technical description of V-Dem’s latent modeling framework. In particular, 
section 2.7 provides an in-depth description of issues related to Historical V-Dem. 
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differences in expert scale perception. Specifically, in initial runs of the measurement model we 
discovered substantial disjunctures between the pre- and post-1900 periods. An inspection of 
raw coder scores indicated that this disjuncture is due to historical experts systematically 
diverging in their codings from their contemporary V-Dem counterparts. Intuitively, experts 
might adjust their scales to the range of institutional quality that they observe across the 
observations that they consider – with historical experts applying more favorable judgments to 
the quality of democracy in the 19th century, presumably because they are implicitly “historicizing” 
their subject matter.  To compensate for this effect, we have adjusted the measurement model to 
include country-specific offsets into the prior values for the years that historical experts coded.4 
 
6. Patterns of democratization in the early part of 
modern history 
Historical V-Dem includes data for 91 countries; however, coverage varies across questions. We 
focus here on 68 polities that have data for all indicators entering the V-Dem Polyarchy 
(“Electoral democracy”) index (Teorell et al. 2018). (In subsequent editions of the dataset we 
hope to rectify missingness so that close to the full complement of 91 countries can be included.) 
We start by considering the average trend in Polyarchy from 1789 to 1945. This period includes 
Huntington’s (1991) “first wave of democratization” but also the “first reverse wave” in the 
inter-war years. 
 
																																								 																				
4 Specifically, we model our prior belief about the value of a historical observation as the sum of the ordinal value 
provided by the expert for that observation and the average difference between her yearly codings during the 
overlap period (typically 1900-1920) and the average yearly codings of the contemporary experts, restricted such that 
the value does not go beyond the range of the ordinal scale. This sum is normalized across all country-years 
(contemporary and historical) to calculate the prior. 
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Figure 1. The First Wave, 1789-1944 
  
 
Figure 1 reveals that the upward trend in Polyarchy from 1789 to WWI, i.e., the long 19th 
century, is gradual. There is a brief dent in the steady upward slope around the revolutionary year 
of 1848, but overall, as argued by Weyland (2014), several of the revolutionary events were 
largely contained within the respective countries and did not ripple across either Europe or other 
continents. Only with the truly international event of WWI do we see a large spike in Polyarchy. 
Overall, the shape of the trend is in line with Congleton’s (2011) description of the 19th century 
as an era of multiple, minor, liberal reforms. The first wave was not only a long wave; it was also 
a slow wave. 
This aggregate pattern is fairly similar according to the Polity2 index, as Figure 1 shows. 
However, these data sources are quite different in other respects. First, since the Polyarchy index 
combines information from a number of underlying indicators, we are able to drill down to view 
the evolution of its constituent parts. (Polity2 also offers opportunities for disaggregation. 
However, there are just a few components of this index, and these components are themselves 
highly aggregated and therefore not as informative.) In Figure 2, we show the trajectories of all 
five of Dahl’s (1998) institutional guarantees (the components of Polyarchy): elected officials, 
0
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free and fair elections, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and suffrage.5 With few 
exceptions, they trend upwards throughout the long 19th century, but they also reveal some 
hitherto unexplored patterns. 
 
Figure 2. Polyarchy Components, 1789-1944 
   
 
To begin with, freedom of expression actually declined after the French Revolution and 
during the Napoleonic wars. Moreover, the “freedom” components are the one in highest 
observance, whereas the more strictly political ones, concerning the electability of executives and 
legislatures, the fairness (or even holding) of elections, and suffrage extension, display much 
lower average scores throughout most of the 19th century. This is markedly different from the 
20th century after WWII, where suffrage and elected officials are the clearly highest-ranking 
components of Polyarchy. Finally, Figure 2 shows that suffrage is the aspect of Polyarchy that 
had the lowest average scores, at least from 1850 to WWI, which might explain why universal 
suffrage has often been treated as the “crowning event” of democratization during the first wave. 
																																								 																				
5 These components, in turn, draw on, respectively, 15, 8, 6, 8, and 1 Historical V-Dem indicators. Freedom of 
expression is the only part of the index construction that differs (though only slightly) from contemporary V-Dem: 
One media indicator (v2mecenefm) was not included in the historical survey. The Bayesian Factor Analysis index on 
freedom of expression is therefore run without this indicator. 
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The second conspicuous difference between Polity2 and Polyarchy is that Polity2 offers a more 
lenient standard of democracy, signaled by Polyarchy’s consistently lower values in Figure 1. To 
show this difference more precisely, Figure 3 plots the Polyarchy scores against Polity2 scores 
(re-scaled 0-1), averaged across the 1789–1945 period, for the 56 countries covered by both 
measures. The diagonal line marks no average differences (which might mask yearly differences 
that cancel each other out), so countries above the line have larger Polyarchy scores, and 
countries below have larger Polity2 scores. Consistent with the over-time trends, few countries, 
on average, have higher Polity2- than Polyarchy scores. We have highlighted the three top 
countries in the former group (Denmark, Bavaria and Bulgaria), and the ten countries falling 
furthest below the line in the latter.  
 
Figure 3. Comparing V-Dem Polyarchy to Polity2, 1800-1944 
   
 
Figure 4 plots the latter “top ten” countries over time. The differences are quite 
substantial. Polity2 scores the US at its maximum already in 1871, and does not pick up any 
subsequent change in democracy, despite, for example, de jure and de facto restrictions on voting 
rights for large parts of the population, including women and African-Americans (especially) in 
the South. Similarly, Polity2 ignores suffrage restrictions in Canada, Costa Rica, Greece and 
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Switzerland. Polity2 also has a surprisingly high appraisal of democracy in Ethiopia and Korea, 
despite these polities never holding elections and, with the partial exception of the Great Korean 
Empire from 1897 until Japanese annexation in 1910, severely restricted freedoms of expression 
and association.  
 
Figure 4. Ten Largest Country Discrepancies in Polyarchy vs. Polity2, 1789-1944 
  
 
7. The role of war in democratization across modern 
history 
Finally, we employ Historical V-Dem data to investigate a potential determinant of democracy: 
international conflict. Key criticisms of the democratic peace literature have argued that the latter 
is “putting the cart before the horse” (Thompson, 1996): war affects regime type and not (just) 
vice versa. Gibler (2012) provides a recent, comprehensive empirical treatment, arguing that 
(territorial) war breeds autocracy. According to Gibler, wars create larger armies, which, in turn, 
can be used for internal repression. Wars also induce political centralization, which can lead to 
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dictatorship. Further, populations facing external threats supposedly turn more willing to defer 
to ascendant autocrats. 
Yet, other scholars have argued that war can favor subsequent democratization. 
Summarizing the record in Europe after the two world wars, Therborn (1977, 19) proposed that 
“democracy is largely a martial accomplishment”. Regimes ruling countries that lose in inter-state 
wars are sometimes toppled through external intervention (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; 
Pickering and Peceny 2006; Grimm 2008). War, and especially loss in war, can also alter the 
relative power of key domestic groups, sometimes undermining entrenched autocrats and 
strengthening domestic constituencies favoring regime change. 
Empirical studies suggest that the evidence is mixed. There are some indications that war 
hinders democratization (see, e.g., Reiter, 2001; Gibler, 2012; Mitchell, Gates and Hegre, 1999), 
whereas other studies yield null findings (e.g., Oneal and Russett, 2000; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; 
Mansfield and Snyder 2010).  Evidently, a careful assessment of how war affects regime type 
requires data with long time series that also capture detailed institutional features. This is 
especially important given (a) the paucity of inter-state wars; (b) the possibility of temporal 
heterogeneity in the relationship, given changes to the international system and power structure 
(see Boix 2011); and (c) the possibility that war might affect some aspects of democracy, but not 
others. For example, suffrage expansions are often viewed as concessions in return for mass-
conscription (for men) and female labor force participation during times of warfare (e.g., Ticchi 
and Vindigni, 2008).  
We employ Correlates of War (COW) data on inter-state war (Sarkees et al. 2010) for 
1817-2007. To capture the impact of war, we register the number of years a country has 
experienced a war between t-1 and t-5.6 Since an ongoing war may have different implications for 
current regime type than past war exposure, we control for war ongoing at t. For democracy, we 
focus on the discussed Polyarchy measure, but contrast results with Polity2 to investigate 
whether estimates hinge on the measurement of democracy. Our baseline specification is 
intentionally sparse, controlling only for GDP per capita, population, and year-fixed effects. We 
mostly find similar results in models that add country-fixed effects (see Appendix IV).  
 
																																								 																				
6 We find very similar results when using logged number of years. 
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Table 1. Regressing interstate war on Polity2 and Polyarchy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Polity2 Polyarchy Polity2 Polyarchy Polyarchy 
 1817-2006 1817-2006 1817-1918 1817-1918 1918-2006 
 LDV LDV LDV LDV LDV 
War past 5 years -0.098* 0.004** 0.028 0.001 0.005** 
 (-1.87) (2.47) (0.40) (1.21) (2.15) 
Ongoing war 0.112 -0.001 0.145 0.000 -0.002 
 (1.48) (-0.28) (1.26) (0.16) (-0.64) 
Ln(GDPpc) 0.097*** 0.002*** 0.065*** 0.001*** 0.002** 
 (5.49) (3.03) (3.55) (3.19) (2.52) 
Ln(population) 0.027*** 0.000 0.020** 0.000 -0.000 
 (2.61) (0.39) (2.20) (1.05) (-0.05) 
Year-FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 14116 16202 4786 5094 11030 
R2 0.955 0.978 0.977 0.983 0.975 
Notes: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. All models are OLS with errors clustered by country. T-values reported in 
parentheses. 
 
We start out, in Column 1, Table 1, by considering Polity2 for all observations with 
available data (1817–2006). The war experience (past 5 years) coefficient is weakly significant and 
negative, indicating that downturns in Polity2 often follow wars (the negative coefficient is 
further weakened when adding country-fixed effects). Column 2 reports a model (full sample) 
using Polyarchy. In stark contrast to the Polity2 result, Polyarchy is positive and more precisely 
estimated, suggesting that interstate war correlates with subsequent democratization. When 
restricting the sample to the long 19th century, however, ongoing war is statistically insignificant 
both when using Polity2 and Polyarchy. Columns 3-4 re-estimate Columns 1-2, but restricted to 
1817-1918. There is no clear evidence for a relationship in this period, independent of 
democracy measure used. In contrast, when we only employ post-WWI data and use Polyarchy 
(Column 5), we find a clear, positive relationship. 
To probe deeper into what might be driving the relationship between war and democracy 
in the full sample, we disaggregate Polyarchy into its subcomponents, and use them as dependent 
variables in our benchmark specification. These results (see Figure 5) show that freedom of 
association and freedom of expression are not significantly related to past war exposure. In 
contrast, the suffrage-, elected officials-, and free and fair elections indices are all positively 
correlated with past war exposure. Thus, the positive relationship between war and democracy 
seems primarily to work through the electoral channel. This is consistent with the notion that 
participation in free and fair elections (suffrage) is widened by experiences with interstate conflict, 
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perhaps due to dynamics relating to mass mobilization and subsequent bargaining with elites (see 
Ticchi and Vindigni, 2008).  
 
Figure 5. Coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for “War past 5 years” from 
benchmark (full time series) run on Polyarchy’s five subcomponents  
 
 
In sum, our results based on Polyarchy contrast with arguments on the democracy-
hampering effect of war, such as those proposed by Reiter (2001) and Gibler (2012). When 
employing our data, we find that war exposure correlates positively with democracy, and 
particularly when focusing on electoral components such as suffrage extension and cleanness of 
elections. The analysis also leads to two other key observations: First, when checking for 
heterogeneous effects across time, there are indications that the relationship between war and 
democratization has evolved throughout the course of modern history. Second, the choice of 
democracy measure matters for estimates of the relationship between war and democratization. 
For instance, utilizing the Polyarchy measure generates a clear positive association between prior 
war exposure and democratization in the post WWI period, whereas this relationship is different 
when using Polity2. This seems, at least partly, to stem from differences in components included, 
as Polity2, for example, basically ignores suffrage, a vital component in Polyarchy (and most 
other common notions of democracy).    
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8. Conclusion 
We have laid out the general features and content of Historical V-Dem, and described how it 
addresses issues of reliability, validity, inter-temporal- and cross-country comparability. When 
combined with contemporary V-Dem, the about 260 indicators contained in Historical V-Dem 
open up new possibilities for drawing on historical information from the entirety of “modern 
history” to inform the study of democracy and related phenomena. Here, we have shown how 
the detailed nature of V-Dem data can be used to identify trends in democracy and to explore 
the relationship between interstate war and democratization. Subsequent research can use these 
data to delve more closely into potential determinants and effects of different varieties of 
democracy, as well as effects of more specific political institutions. 
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Appendix I: Sample 
The authoritative list by Gleditsch & Ward (1999) served as the point of departure for delimiting 
the current sample.i More specifically, the main criteria for including polities is that they are a) 
fairly sizeable (>250000 inhabitants); b) sovereign during an extended time period between 1789 
and 1900, either in a formal-juridical or de facto sense; and, that they c) match present-day state 
units. 
Historical V-Dem includes another 20 polities not covered by Gleditsch & Ward (1999). 
After a careful mapping of potential polities to be included these are polities that corresponds to 
a contemporary state and that, despite the lack of international sovereignty, wielded sufficient de 
facto domestic sovereignty (over an extended period prior to 1900) for being considered as at least 
semi-sovereign. This means that we included Australia, Finland, Hungary, Kuwait, Norway, New 
Zealand, Poland and Yemen as well as two “precursor” polities of contemporary states where 
borders do not quite fit the latter (Nejd/Saudi Arabia, Bukhara/Uzbekistan). In addition, we 
included a selection of colonies/protectorates, including the two most populous, namely British 
India and the Dutch West Indies (Indonesia), plus three smaller, namely Cuba, Singapore and 
Zanzibar. Finally, due to a particular extra grant, we included five additional pre-unification 
German principalities below the 250,000 population threshold (Brunswick, Hamburg, Oldenburg, 
Nassau and Saxe-Weimar).  
 
Table A.I lists the time series for each polity included in Historical V-Dem. 
  
																																								 																				
i Gleditsch and Ward (1999) identify 75 independent polities pre-1900. Two polities from this list, which do not 
neatly map onto borders of a contemporary state entity (Orange Free State and Transvaal), plus one short-lived 
polity (Algeria prior to the French conquest), are currently not included in Historical V-Dem. Since we also treat 
Colombia and Gran Colombia, as well as Guatemala and the United Provinces of Central America, as one case each, 
but Piedmont-Sardinia as separate from pre-unification Italy, we end up with 91 polities after adding 20 extra polities 
(75-3-2+1+20=91). 
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Table A.I: Countries and years covered in Historical V-Dem 
 
Note: This is the maximum coverage in the dataset, pertaining to some of the included (A) variables. Coverage varies 
between variables. 
  
Polity Years covered Polity Years covered 
Afghanistan 1789-1920 Mecklenburg Schwerin 1789-1867 
Argentina 1789-1920 Mexico 1789-1920 
Australia 1789-1920 Modena 1789-1797; 1814-1859 
Austria 1789-1938 Montenegro 1789-1918 
Baden 1789-1871 Morocco 1789-1920 
Bavaria 1789-1871 Nassau 1806-1866; 1900-1920 
Belgium 1789-1795; 1830-1920 Nepal 1789-1920 
Bolivia 1825-1920 Netherlands 1789-1810; 1813-1920 
Brazil 1789-1920 New Zealand 1841-1920 
Brunswick 1789-1807; 1813-1867 Nicaragua 1838-1920 
Bulgaria 1878-1920 Norway 1789-1920 
Burma/Myanmar 1789-1920 Oldenburg 1789-1810; 1813-1867 
Canada 1841-1920 Oman 1789-1920 
Chile 1789-1920 Orange Free State 1854-1910 
China 1789-1920 Papal States 1789-1809; 1814-1870 
Colombia 1789-1920 Paraguay 1811-1920 
Costa Rica 1838-1920 Parma 1789-1802; 1814-1859 
Cuba 1789-1920 Peru 1789-1920 
Denmark 1789-1920 Piedmont-Sardinia 1789-1861 
Dominican Republic 1789-1822; 1844-1920 Poland 
1789-1795; 1807-1867; 1918-
1938 
Ecuador 1830-1920 Portugal 1789-1920 
Egypt 1789-1920 Romania 1789-1920 
El Salvador 1838-1920 Russia 1789-1920 
Ethiopia 1789-1920 Saudi Arabia 1789-1818; 1822-1952 
Finland 1809-1920 Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach 1809-1867 
France 1789-1920 Saxony 1789-1867 
Germany 1789-1920 Serbia 1804-1813; 1815-1918 
Greece 1822-1920 Singapore 1867-1920 
Guatemala 1789-1822; 1823-1920 Spain 1789-1920 
Haiti 1789-1920 Sweden 1789-1920 
Hamburg 1789-1810; 1813-1867 Switzerland 1798-1920 
Hanover 1789-1810; 1813-1866 Thailand 1789-1920 
Hesse-Darmstadt 1789-1871 Transvaal 1852-1910 
Hesse-Kassel 1789-1866 Tunisia 1789-1920 
Honduras 1838-1920 Turkey 1789-1920 
Hungary 1789-1938 Tuscany 1789-1807; 1814-1861 
India 1789-1920 Two Sicilies 1789-1860 
Indonesia 1800-1920 United Kingdom 1789-1920 
Iran 1789-1920 
United States of 
America 1789-1920 
Italy 1861-1920 Uruguay 1825-1920 
Japan 1789-1920 Uzbekistan 1789-1920; 1990-2010 
Korea, South 1789-1920 Venezuela 1789-1819; 1830-1920 
Kuwait 1789-1920 Vietnam, Republic of 1802-1922 
Liberia 1821-1920 Wurtemberg 1789-1871 
Libya 1789-1834; 1911-1933; 1952-1972 Yemen 1789-1850; 1918-1938 
Luxembourg 1815-1920 Zanzibar 1856-1920 
Madagascar 1817-1920   
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Appendix II: Variables included 
 
Table A.II: “A variables” included in Historical V-Dem. 
 
Variable tag Variable name 
v3canagelc Minimum candidate age parliament/lower chamber 
v3canageuc Minimum candidate age upper chamber 
v3clslavery Slavery 
v3elage Minimum voting age parliament/lower chamber 
v3elagepr Minimum voting age presidency 
v3elageuc Minimum voting age upper chamber 
v3eldirelc Direct parliamentary/lower chamber elections 
v3eldirepr Direct presidential elections 
v3eldireuc Direct upper chamber elections 
v3elfemrst Female suffrage restricted 
v3elloelsy Lower chamber electoral system, fine-grained 
v3elloseat Lower chamber election seats 
v3ellostlg Lower chamber election seats won by largest party 
v3ellostsl Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party 
v3ellostsm Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party 
v3ellostss Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party 
v3ellosttm Lower chamber election seats won by third largest party 
v3ellostts Lower chamber election seat share won by third largest party 
v3ellovtlg Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter 
v3ellovtsm Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter 
v3ellovttm Lower chamber election vote share of third-largest vote-getter 
v3elncbmaj Minority or majority government 
v3elncbpr Effective number of cabinet parties 
v3elparlel Lower chamber electoral system 
v3elrstrlc Candidate exclusions (de jure) parliament/lower chamber 
v3elrstrpr Candidate exclusions (de jure) presidential elections 
v3elrstrup Candidate exclusions (de jure) upper chamber 
v3elsec (De jure) ballot secrecy 
v3elsuffrage Percentage of population with suffrage 
v3eltrnout Election turnout 
v3eltvrig Lower chamber election turnover 
v3eltvriguc Upper chamber election turnover 
v3elupseat Upper chamber election seats 
v3elupstsl Upper chamber election seats won by largest party 
v3elupstsm Upper chamber election seats won by second largest party 
v3elupvtlg Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter 
v3elupvtsm Upper chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter 
v3elvotlrg Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter 
v3elvotsml Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter 
v3elvstrlc Suffrage exclusions (de jure) parliament/lower chamber 
v3elvstrpr Suffrage exclusions (de jure) presidential elections 
v3elvstruc Suffrage exclusions (de jure) upper chamber 
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v3elwomcab Election women in the cabinet 
v3exagehog HOG age 
v3exagehos HOS age 
v3exaphogp HOG selection by legislature in practice 
v3exaphos HOS selection by legislature in practice 
v3exapup Chief executive appointment by upper chamber 
v3exapupap Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval 
v3exdeathog HOG year of death 
v3exdeathos HOS year of death 
v3exothhgl HOG other appointing body in practice 
v3exothhs HOS other appointing body in practice 
v3expathhg HOG appointment in practice 
v3expathhs HOS appointment in practice 
v3lgamend Legislature amends constitution 
v3lgamnsty Legislature amnesties 
v3lgcamoth Legislature other than uni- or bicameral 
v3lgelecup Upper chamber elected 
v3lgello Lower chamber elected 
v3lginello Lower chamber indirectly elected 
v3lginelup Upper chamber indirectly elected 
v3lgintblo Lower chamber introduces bills 
v3lgintbup Upper chamber introduces bills 
v3lglegllo Lower chamber legislates by law 
v3lgleglup Upper chamber legislates by law 
v3lgqumin Lower chamber quota for social groups 
v3lgtreaty Legislature approval of treaties by law 
v3lgwarlaw Legislature declares war by law 
v3lpname Name of largest party 
v3pechilabl Child labor laws 
v3peminwage Minimum wage 
v3peminwagerestr Minimum wage provision 
v3psagefirst Party age largest 
v3psagepm Party age executive 
v3psagesecond Party age second largest 
v3psagethird Party age third largest 
v3regendtypems Regime end type 
v3regint Regime interregnum 
v3serfdeju Serfdom 
v3slpname Name of second largest party 
v3stcensus Census 
v3stcitlaw Citizenship laws 
v3stflag Flag 
v3stnatant National anthem 
v3stnatbank National bank 
v3ststatag Statistical agency 
v3ststybcov Statistical yearbook covered 
v3ststybpub Statistical yearbook published 
v3tlpname Name of third largest party 
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v3ttlvote Total votes 
 
Note: A variables are coded by research assistants. See V-Dem v.8 codebook for specifics on questions, clarifications, 
and answer categories. HOG=Head of Government. HOS=Head of State. 
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Table A.III: “A* variables” included in Historical V-Dem (see V-Dem v.8 codebook for specifics). 
 
Variable tag Variable name 
v3ellocelc Local government elected 
v3ellocgov Local government exists 
v3ellocnam Local government name 
v3elreggov Regional government exists 
v3elregnam Regional government name 
v3elsrgel Regional government elected 
v3eltype Election type 
v3exhoshog HOS = HOG 
v3exnamhog HOG name 
v3exnamhos HOS name 
v3extithog Title of HOG 
v3extithos HOS title 
v3juhcname High court name 
v3juhcourt High court existence 
v3lgbicam Legislature bicameral 
v3lgnamelo Lower chamber legislature name 
v3lgnameup Upper chamber name 
v3regendtype Regime end type 
v3reginfo Regime information 
Note: A* variables are pre-coded by research assistants and are entered as relevant information in the expert surveys. 
These variables may be adjusted based on expert feedback. See V-Dem v.8 codebook for specifics on questions, 
clarifications, and answer categories. HOG=Head of Government. HOS=Head of State. 
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Table A.IV: “C variables” included in Historical V-Dem  
 
Variable tag Variable name 
v3clacfree Freedom of academic and cultural expression 
v3clacjstm Access to justice for men 
v3clacjstw Access to justice for women 
v3clacjust Social class equality in respect for civil liberty 
v3cldiscm Freedom of discussion for men 
v3cldiscw Freedom of discussion for women 
v3cldmovem Freedom of domestic movement for men 
v3cldmovew Freedom of domestic movement for women 
v3clfmove Freedom of foreign movement 
v3clkill Freedom from political killings 
v3cllabrig Labor rights 
v3clprptym Property rights for men 
v3clprptyw Property rights for women 
v3clrelig Freedom of religion 
v3clrgunev Regional unevenness in respect for civil liberties 
v3clrspct Rigorous and impartial public administration 
v3clslavef Freedom from forced labor for women 
v3clslavem Freedom from forced labor for men 
v3clsocgrp Social group equality in respect for civil liberties 
v3clstown State ownership of economy 
v3cltort Freedom from torture 
v3cltrnslw Transparent laws with predictable enforcement 
v3csanmvch CSO anti-system movement character 
v3csantimv CSO anti-system movements 
v3cscnsult CSO consultation 
v3cseeorgs CSO entry and exit 
v3csgender CSO women’s participation 
v3csprtcpt CSO participatory environment 
v3csreprss CSO repression 
v3csrlgcon Religious organization consultation 
v3csrlgrep Religious organization repression 
v3csstruc CSO structure 
v3dlconslt Range of consultation 
v3dlencmps Particularistic or public goods 
v3dlengage Engaged society 
v3elaccept Election losers accept results 
v3elasmoff Election assume office 
v3elbalpap Voting, voice or ballot 
v3elbalstat Ballot printing 
v3elboycot Election boycotts 
v3elcomvot Compulsory voting 
v3eldonate Disclosure of campaign donations 
v3elecsedf Secret ballot, de facto 
v3elembaut EMB autonomy 
v3elembcap EMB capacity 
v3elffelr Subnational elections free and fair 
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v3elfrfair Election free and fair 
v3elintim Election government intimidation 
v3elirreg Election other voting irregularities 
v3ellocpwr Local offices relative power 
v3elmalalc Malapportionment legislature/lower chamber 
v3elmalauc Malapportionment upper chamber 
v3elmalsuf Election male suffrage in practice 
v3elmulpar Elections multiparty 
v3elpeace Election other electoral violence 
v3elpubfin Public campaign finance 
v3elreapplc Reapportionment legislature/lower chamber 
v3elreappuc Reapportionment upper chamber 
v3elrgpwr Regional offices relative power 
v3elrgstry Election voter registry 
v3elsnlsff Subnational election unevenness 
v3elvotbuy Election vote buying 
v3equavolc Equal vote legislature/lower chamber 
v3equavouc Equal vote upper chamber 
v3exbribe Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges 
v3excrptps Public sector corrupt exchanges 
v3exctlhg HOG control over 
v3exctlhog HOG other body controls 
v3exctlhos HOS other body controls 
v3exctlhs HOS control over 
v3exdfcbhs HOS appoints cabinet in practice 
v3exdfdmhs HOS dismisses ministers in practice 
v3exdfdshg HOG dismisses ministers in practice 
v3exdfdshs HOS dissolution in practice 
v3exdfpphg HOG proposes legislation in practice 
v3exdfpphs HOS proposes legislation in practice 
v3exdfvthg HOG veto power in practice 
v3exdfvths HOS veto power in practice 
v3exdjcbhg HOG appoints cabinet in practice 
v3exdjdshg HOG dissolution in practice 
v3exembez Executive embezzlement and theft 
v3exremhog HOG removal by legislature in practice 
v3exremhsp HOS removal by legislature in practice 
v3exrescon Executive respects constitution 
v3exrmhgnp HOG removal by other in practice 
v3exrmhgop HOG other body remove HOG in practice 
v3exrmhsnl HOS other body removes in practice 
v3exrmhsol HOS removal by other in practice 
v3exthftps Public sector theft 
v3juaccnt Judicial accountability 
v3jucomp Compliance with judiciary 
v3jucorrdc Judicial corruption decision 
v3juhccomp Compliance with high court 
v3juhcind High court independence 
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v3juncind Lower court independence 
v3jureview Judicial review 
v3lgbudglo Lower chamber budget 
v3lgbudgup Upper chamber budget 
v3lgcomslo Lower chamber committees 
v3lgcrrpt Legislature corrupt activities 
v3lgdomchm Legislature dominant chamber 
v3lgfunds Legislature controls resources 
v3lginses Lower chamber in session 
v3lginsesup Upper chamber in session 
v3lginvstp Legislature investigates in practice 
v3lglegplo Lower chamber legislates in practice 
v3lglegpup Upper chamber legislates in practice 
v3lgoppart Legislature opposition parties 
v3lgotovst Executive oversight 
v3lgqstexp Legislature questions officials in practice 
v3lgsrvlo Lower chamber members serve in government 
v3meaccess Media access 
v3mebias Media bias 
v3mecrit Print/broadcast media critical 
v3meharjrn Harassment of journalists 
v3merange Print/broadcast media perspectives 
v3meslfcen Media self-censorship 
v3partyid Party identification 
v3pepwrgen Power distributed by gender 
v3pepwrses Power distributed by socioeconomic position 
v3pepwrsoc Power distributed by social group 
v3psbantar Party ban target 
v3psbars Barriers to parties 
v3pscnslnl Candidate selection---national/local 
v3pscohesv Legislative party cohesion 
v3pscomprg Party competition across regions 
v3psoppaut Opposition parties autonomy 
v3psorgs Party organizations 
v3psparban Party ban 
v3psplats Distinct party platforms 
v3psprbrch Party branches 
v3psprlnks Party linkages 
v3pssunpar Subnational party control 
v3psswitch Party switching 
v3regimpgroup Regime most important support group 
v3regsupgroups Regime support groups 
v3regsupgroupssize Regime support groups size 
v3regsuploc Regime support location 
v3stcritapparm Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces 
v3stcritrecadm Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration 
v3stfisccap State fiscal capacity 
v3strenadm Bureaucratic remuneration 
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v3strenarm Remuneration in the Armed Forces 
v3struinvadm Rulers’ involvement in the state administration 
v3ststeecap State steering capacity 
v3svdomaut Domestic autonomy 
v3svinlaut International autonomy 
v3svstpop State authority over population 
v3svstterr State authority over territory 
Note: C variables are coded by country experts, and scores are subsequently adjusted in the V-Dem measurement 
model to achieve cross-country and inter-temporal comparability. See V-Dem v.8 codebook for specifics on 
questions, clarifications, and answer categories. HOG=Head of Government. HOS=Head of State. EMB=Election 
Monitoring Board. CSO=Civil Society Organization. 
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Appendix III: Anchoring vignettes 
 
Historical V-Dem makes extensive use of anchoring vignettes to improve cross-country 
comparability (King et al., 2004; King and Wand, 2007; Bakker et al., 2014). Anchoring vignettes 
are descriptions of specific, but hypothetical – or at least unnamed – cases that provide the 
information required to answer a certain question. In the context of V-Dem, they are 
descriptions of hypothetical country-years that focus on describing the country’s status specific to 
one V-Dem indicator. Coders’ ratings of the hypothetical cases, once combined, provide 
information about differences in how they translate concrete aspects of cases into ordinal ratings. 
There are several reasons vignettes are a powerful and efficient tool for addressing differential 
item functioning (DIF) in V-Dem ratings.  
• Raters have all the information about the case in question at their fingertips and coding 
vignettes, therefore, requires substantially less coder effort than evaluating actual cases. 
This makes vignettes substantially less costly for coders than bridge or lateral coding and 
raters can provide more vignette responses in a given set of time.  
• Vignettes require no case knowledge, so everyone can do them, even experts who are not 
qualified to rate multiple countries. 
• Vignettes provide perfect overlap, because every rater answers the same questions. 
• Vignettes provide high threshold variability, because we control their content and strive 
to maximize that variability. 
• Because we know that every rater considers the same information when they rate a 
vignette, we can assume potentially low random error in the rating process and treat all 
cross-coder variation as evidence of threshold differences. 
• In asking all coders to code vignettes, we address potential selection bias introduced by 
having only those who opt in to bridge and lateral coding - i.e., those who are either most 
knowledgeable about the world or those who just think they are - provide data to adjust 
for cross-country comparability. 
Ultimately, the vignettes exercise within Historical V-Dem included vignettes for the vast 
majority of its expert coded (C) questions, with multiple vignettes for each of these questions. 
This section of the appendix describes our approach to this exercise and explains the choices we 
made. 
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Where possible, the V-Dem vignettes approach followed the prevailing best practices 
according to the literature. However, the literature provides little guidance on a number of 
problems that are specific to V-Dem. In particular, the raw size of the V-Dem survey, and our 
reliance on a limited pool of expert coders, introduces a number of logistical constraints. First, 
we had to decide which questions should be vignetted. The literature tells us to vignette any 
question that could be subject to cross-country coding differences. However, vignetting all 
questions that would fall in this category was not feasible. We were therefore in the position of 
attempting to define what would constitute “high priority” vignette questions. We evaluated each 
question on 73 characteristics that we thought would affect coding difficulty and, in turn, increase 
cross-country rating differences (e.g., length of the question, whether or not relative terms of 
degree differentiate the answer categories, and whether the question was getting at one or more 
underlying concepts). Using these characteristics, we selected the questions we thought were 
vulnerable to DIF, for a total of 117 questions, out of 149 C-questions in total. 
The next task was to determine how we would construct vignettes for these selected 
questions. The literature suggests constructing many vignettes for each question, so as to 
generate as much information as possible about each coder's thresholds, and to maximize the 
probability of producing vignettes that are discriminating and effectively span the latent scale in 
question (Hopkins and King, 2010). But, mainly because we did not want to ask too much of our 
coders – and also because time constraints made producing sufficient quantities of vignettes 
difficult – we fielded only a few vignettes for each question. We attempted to field vignettes that 
would give us the greatest DIF information for least coder time. Since thresholds are effectively a 
coder's border between two answer categories, we decided to attempt to construct vignettes that 
were right on these thresholds, designed to be challenging to code as they appeared to straddle 
two answer categories. This would give us information about coder's thresholds in that we would 
learn whether a coder tended to code these border vignettes as belonging in the higher category 
or the lower category. If a question has k answer categories, then it has k-1 borders between 
answer categories.  
However, given how the vignettes were embedded in the data collection tool within 
Historical V-Dem (described below), we were concerned about the potential for coders – either 
consciously or subconsciously – to order the vignettes as they coded them. This would mean that 
the data obtained from the vignettes would not be a clear signal of DIF, but instead would be 
tainted by the degree to which a logical order was apparent across the set of vignettes for a given 
question. To address this, we decided to include “decoy” vignettes for some questions – extra 
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vignettes for one or two border categories to preclude - or at least obstruct - the ordering of the 
vignettes by the coders. Out of the 117 questions to receive vignettes in historical V-Dem, we 
randomly assigned questions to receive either k-1 vignettes (one for each border category), k 
vignettes (one for each border category and one decoy), or k+1 vignettes (one for each border 
category and two decoys). 
We then had to design a process to write the vignettes. We did not want to require 
Project Managers (PMs) and Principal Investigators (PIs) to write many paragraphs about fake 
countries, but we nonetheless wanted them to vet the vignettes. To strike a balance, a group of 
masters students at the University of Gothenburg wrote the vignettes (editing each other's work 
in an iterated process), and then the V-Dem Project Manager in charge of the question edited the 
vignettes for that question. The overarching guidelines for writing the vignettes were as follows: 
• ON ONE HAND: Each vignette should be as specific as possible. It should include 
details about all aspects of the answer categories. 
• ON THE OTHER HAND: Vignettes should NOT include details that are not part of 
the answer categories. Even the shortest word (e.g. adding the word "small" or 
"European" to describe the country) can add an irrelevant case detail that affects coding. 
• Vignettes should be 1-2 paragraphs long. 
• Vignettes should not obviously map to a question category. One way to ensure this is not 
the case is to vary the order of pieces of information in the vignette compared to pieces 
of information in the answer categories. For example, if an answer category talks about 
the geographic spread of fraud and then the kind of fraud, either reverse the order in the 
vignette or find a way to talk about both together. 
• Vignettes should not obviously map to real cases. If coders can discern the case on which 
a vignette is based, then they could be influenced by the irrelevant details of that case. In 
other words, drawing content from a real case is fine, but please make sure it is not 
obvious. 
An example of question wording and corresponding border vignettes appears in Table A.V.ii 
 
																																								 																				
ii Note that the election vote buying represents a rather difficult question to vignette. The question requires a 
clarification and the answer categories touch on number of aspects of vote-buying (i.e. percentage of population 
involved, fraction of parties involved, geographical spread, the extent to which bribes bought turnout and votes), 
even though the concept is purported to be uni-dimensional. Thus, we use this question as an example because it 
highlights how reliant vignettes - but also IRT-based methods more generally - are on the qualities of the underlying 
questions. 
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Table A.V: Vignettes for V-Dem Question on “Election Vote Buying” 
Border Category Vignette 
0-1 In Country A, vote buying was a common strategy for several parties attempting to gather 
votes in the last election. The largest party is known for bribing people at all levels to vote 
for them. Some other parties approach only citizens in the poorer areas, offering cash or 
other handouts to place a vote for them on Election Day. However, one party probably did 
not engage in vote buying. 
1-2 In Country B, a few of the well-resourced parties went around in many areas distributing 
cash handouts and material gifts such as clothing before the last elections. However, some 
news media reported that citizens in these areas sometimes accepted gifts from more than 
one party, so it is unclear how much this was about vote buying or just encouraging the 
voters in these areas to take the parties and candidates seriously. Yet, other citizens testified 
that they only took gifts from the party they would vote for. 
2-3 In Country C, national laws outlaw the transaction of money for votes. However, in the last 
election, some parties managed to circumvent these laws by providing other materials, such 
as food items or cheap personal electronics, and it seems that cash may also have been 
handed out in certain districts. Due to the small scope, it is unclear if the parties in question 
sought to persuade potential voters or if it was just about recognizing some citizens who 
have been loyal supporters. In any case, it is unlikely to have affected election results. 
3-4 In Country D, nearly no parties in the national parliament attempt the method of luring 
voters by material gifts during campaigning. Prior to the latest election, there were some 
reports of one party providing inducements to attend rallies and that it possibly also tried 
convincing some of the poorest communities by distributing gifts, but legal action was taken 
against this party. 
 
Once the vignette texts were ready, we had to decide how to incorporate them in the data 
collection tool that coders used. Past literature has revealed that it is best to provide respondents 
with vignettes before they code, as this “anchors” them to a common scale (Hopkins and King, 
2010). Accordingly, the coders were asked to code the vignettes for a given question before 
completing the question. To guard against coders attempting to order the vignettes as they coded 
them for each question, each question was randomly assigned one of five scrambled sequences 
for its vignettes. 
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Appendix IV: Robustness tests for analysis on interstate 
war and democracy 
 
Table A.VI: Regressing interstate war on Polity2 and Polyarchy, adding country-fixed 
effects to the benchmark. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Polity2 Polyarchy Polity2 Polyarchy Polyarchy 
 1817-2006 1817-2006 1817-1918 1817-1918 1918-2006 
War past 5 yrs. -0.072 0.004** 0.052 0.002 0.005** 
 (-1.21) (2.52) (0.69) (1.48) (2.03) 
Ongoing war 0.106 -0.001 0.148 -0.000 -0.002 
 (1.33) (-0.36) (1.28) (-0.04) (-0.72) 
Ln(GDPpc) 0.083** 0.002* 0.203*** 0.005*** -0.000 
 (2.60) (1.73) (3.74) (4.29) (-0.23) 
Ln(population) -0.074 -0.001 -0.048 0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.49) (-1.17) (-0.82) (1.26) (-1.02) 
Country-FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year-FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 14116 16202 4786 5094 11030 
R2 0.904 0.956 0.921 0.930 0.933 
Notes: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. All models are OLS with errors clustered by country. T-values reported in 
parentheses. 
 
